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1. SUMMARY AND PRINCIPAL CONCLUSIONS
1.1. Introduction
In its final report on the implementation of the 1998 regulatory framework
1, and subsequently
in its Communication ‘Electronic Communications: the Road to the Knowledge Economy’
2,
the Commission stressed the importance of a full, effective and timely transition to the new
EU framework for electronic communications networks and services adopted by the
Parliament and Council in March  2002. This position has been strongly endorsed by the
European Parliament.
3
The transition to the new framework will support the continued growth of the electronic
communications sector, and in particular of broadband connections as a major factor con-
tributing to the fulfilment of the Lisbon objectives. The Growth Initiative
4 launched by the
Commission in July 2003 underlines the importance of broadband for economic prosperity,
competitiveness and job creation.
The new framework is designed to ensure that ex ante regulation is applied only where the
level of competition in defined markets is considered to be insufficient on the basis of an
analysis consistent with competition law methodology. Newly emerging markets also should
in principle be free from regulation. This approach should boost competition at the level of
networks and platforms, while giving national regulatory authorities (NRAs) the tools to
mandate access to networks where justified by a lack of competitive pressure on dominant
operators.
Other key aspects of the framework are designed to support this approach to regulation and
the promotion of consumers’ interests. NRAs are given increased powers to promote a sin-
gle European market for electronic communications networks and services; players can in
principle enter markets on the basis of general authorisation; access and interconnection re-
gimes are based on commercial negotiation, backed by strong NRA powers to ensure end-to-
end communications in Europe; and the citizen is protected by a clear and comprehensive
framework of universal service and privacy rules, including rules against spamming.
1.2. Implementation of the new regulatory framework
The European Parliament and Council set a legal deadline of 24 July 2003 for the transposi-
tion of the main provisions of the new framework.
As of 1 November, only eight countries had taken action to incorporate the Framework,
Authorisation, Access and Universal Service Directives into national law. These are:
Denmark, Spain, Ireland, Italy, Austria, Finland, Sweden and the United Kingdom.
                                                
1 European telecoms regulation and markets 2002: Eighth report on the implementation of the telecom-
munications regulatory package, COM(2002) 695 final, 3 December 2002.
2 COM(2003) 65, 11 February 2003.
3 See European Parliament Resolution of [17 November 2003].
4 An initiative for growth: Investing in Trans-European Networks and major R&D projects,
SEC(2003) 813 09, July 2003, which was followed by a further Communication from the Commission
– A European initiative for growth: Investing in networks and knowledge for growth and employment –
Interim Report to the European Council, COM(2003) 579 Final, 1 October 2003.4
In some cases, secondary legislation is still required to ensure full transposition.
Of those Member States that have not yet notified the Commission of transposition measures,
there is particular concern that the passage of drafts through the legislative process is likely to
be lengthy (Germany, France); that political uncertainties are causing delays (Belgium); or
simply that despite the existence of drafts the legislative process has not yet been completed
(Greece, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Portugal).
Infringement proceedings against the Member States that had not then adopted legislation
were opened in early October 2003 under Article 226 of the Treaty, for failure to communi-
cate transposition measures to the Commission.
Five countries had adopted measures to transpose the e-Privacy Directive by the deadline of
31 October. They are:
Denmark, Spain, Italy, Austria and Sweden.
In the United Kingdom the regulations transposing the e-Privacy Directive are due to come
into force on 11 December 2003.
Six countries had notified measures transposing the Competition Directive by 31 October.
They are:
Denmark, Ireland, Italy, Austria, Finland and the United Kingdom.
5
1.3. Markets for electronic communications networks and services
In its last report the Commission referred to the fragile state of the electronic communications
market in the light of a number of factors, including the global economic slowdown and the
level of debt on the part of some market players due to ill-timed investment in backbone
networks, the cost of 3G licenses and the high prices paid for the acquisition of other opera-
tors in other countries.
The situation now appears to be stabilising. As far as the wider economy is concerned, the
Commission’s Autumn Economic Forecasts
6 indicate that there are now signs that the EU
area is about to embark on a period of recovery. Both business and consumer confidence are
reported to be improving as the world economy gathers momentum, while financial condi-
tions are believed to be supportive of growth.
This renewed confidence is echoed in the electronic communications market.
  The rate of growth in revenues is expected to reach between 3.7%
7 and 4.7%
8 in nominal
terms in 2003.
  The number of mobile subscribers will grow at a higher rate than in 2002, even if the
penetration rate is close to 90% in a number of EU countries. 3G services are now avail-
able in at least four Member States.
                                                
5 Measures aiming to transpose the Competition Directive were adopted by the Spanish Parliament on
16 October 2003.
6 http://europa.eu.int/comm/economy_finance/publications/european_economy/2003/ee503en.pdf
7 Source: EITO (European Information technology Observatory) 2003, Update October.
8 Source: IDATE.5
  The number of fixed broadband access lines almost doubled between July  2002 and
July 2003. New entrants’ market share is starting to pick up but its impact is limited and
competition in the broadband sector is still weak.
  The number of new unbundled lines has increased by 828 000 between July 2002 and
July 2003. This is double the number compared to the previous year but is still low as a
proportion of total subscriber lines and the development of local loop unbundling is still
rather unbalanced across the EU and has not yet taken off.
  The recent period of economic weakness has discouraged new fixed operators from en-
tering the voice telephony market: the number of large competing operators in each na-
tional market has remained more or less stable. Many operators have refocused their efforts
on home markets.
  Existing fixed operators now aim mostly at maintaining the position acquired in the market
during the years of market growth, in particular for international and long-distance traffic,
where there was strong competition during the first stage of liberalisation. Competitive
pressure seems to have moved to the local call segment, where the incumbents’ fixed
market share has on average decreased by 6% since December 2002.
  This is a consequence of the increasing use by subscribers of alternative operators for
local calls; this has grown over the past year by 39%, due partly to the more widespread
availability of carrier pre-selection. Moreover, despite a converging trend there is still a
substantial difference between the use of alternative operators for local calls (25% of the
total subscribers) and for long distance/international calls (33%).
  Alternative fixed operators actually competing in the market are continuing to focus on
their core markets, through carrier selection or pre-selection (two thirds of active operators)
or through direct access to the users (one third of active operators).
  Since August 2002, the EU weighted average charge for call termination on fixed net-
works has decreased slightly at local and single transit levels (down 4% and 6% respec-
tively), but has remained stable at double transit level.
  The EU weighted average call termination charges on mobile networks have decreased
by 15.3% for SMP mobile operators, while for non-SMP operators they have remained
more or less stable. Despite these decreases they remain more than nine times higher than
the average fixed-to-fixed interconnection charge (double transit).
1.4. Regulatory concerns
The Commission recognises the enormous amount that has been accomplished by the
Member States that have transposed the framework in ensuring that the principles on which it
is based are faithfully carried over into national law.
The national measures (and drafts in the case of Member States that have not yet transposed)
however give rise to some concerns that the Commission considers should be addressed if the
objectives of the new framework are to be realised to the full. The Commission will monitor
in particular where the Member States have complied with their obligations as regards:6
  The wider powers and discretion conferred on NRAs under the new framework in order
to fulfil their specific objectives relating to the promotion of competition and the de-
velopment of the internal market.
  The assignment of the tasks attributed to NRAs by the framework to competent national
bodies, and the clear attribution of those tasks where they are distributed between differ-
ent bodies.
  The availability to NRAs of the full range of remedies provided for in the new frame-
work, when they find a lack of effective competition in a relevant market.
  The timely completion of the market analyses and review of existing obligations by the
NRAs. Undue delays would undermine the consistent application of the new framework
and postpone the attainment of a single market for electronic communications networks
and services.
  The principles that must apply to procedures for the grant of individual rights of use of
frequencies.
  The scope of the universal service, which should be clearly defined in accordance with
the new framework, and the requirement that any mechanisms for designating universal
service providers and for funding any unfair burden on them be established in a way that
minimises market distortion and upholds the principle of non-discrimination. National
measures which diverge from the Community definition of the universal service or de facto
preclude certain operators from being designated as a universal service provider, will jeop-
ardise the attainment of this objective.
2. OBJECTIVES AND METHODOLOGY
Between 1997 and 2002 the Commission submitted eight reports on the implementation of the
package of directives liberalising and harmonising the European markets for telecommu-
nications services.
Following a review, the Commission proposed in 2000 five directives to replace the twenty-
five or so instruments then in force, together with a decision on the use of spectrum for com-
munications services. Four of the directives subsequently adopted by the European Parliament
and Council were required to be transposed into national law by 24 July 2003. They are the
Framework, Authorisation, Access and Interconnection, and Universal Service and Users’
Rights Directives.
9 The remaining directive, known as the e-Privacy or Data Protection
Directive
10, was due for transposition by 31 October 2003. In parallel with this process the
                                                
9 Directive 2002/19/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 7 March 2002 on access to, and
interconnection of, electronic communications networks and facilities; Directive  2002/20/EC of the
European Parliament and of the Council of 7 March 2002 on the authorisation of electronic communi-
cations networks and services; Directive 2002/21/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of
7 March 2002 on a common regulatory framework for electronic communications networks and serv-
ices; and Directive 2002/22/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 7 March 2002 on uni-
versal service and users’ rights relating to electronic communications networks and services, all pub-
lished in OJ L 108, 24.4.2002.
10 Directive 2002/58/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 July 2002 concerning the
processing of personal data and the protection of privacy in the electronic communications sector,
OJ L 201, 31.7.2002, p. 37.7
Commission adopted a directive on the basis of Article 86 of the Treaty (Competition Direc-
tive), consolidating previous directives liberalising the provision of services on these
markets.
11
The Commission is convinced that regular reporting on the status of implementation of the
former regulatory package and on market developments contributed to the success of this
sector in the European economy. The present report marks the Commission’s determination to
continue this process in the context of the new framework.
The main objective of the report is to identify concerns as to the manner in which the key as-
pects of the new framework are incorporated into national law, or drafts thereof in the case of
Member States that have not yet transposed.
12 Where Member States have not yet transposed,
the latest publicly available drafts have been analysed. No draft has been made available by
Portugal. No analysis is made of national measures or drafts relating to the e-Privacy
Directive, given the later deadline for transposition. However, in view of the importance of
subjects such as the treatment of traffic data and unsolicited faxes and e-mails (spam)
covered by the directive, Section 5 identifies key elements of the e-Privacy Directive which
the Commission will take particular care to ensure are effectively transposed by the Member
States.
The Commission’s assessment of the transposition of the key elements of the new framework
represents its view as at 1 November 2003, in the light of the texts transmitted to it and of
bilateral contacts with national authorities. However, in the final resort it is the European
Court of Justice that has sole jurisdiction for assessing the compliance of national transposing
measures with the Member States’ Treaty obligations.
Furthermore, since the report has been prepared at a time when the legislative picture across
the Community is still developing, any assessment of conformity can only be of a preliminary
nature and cannot represent a definitive view on the part of the Commission. In view of this
fact, the annexes to this report do not contain country-specific chapters detailing the level of
implementation in each Member State, as was the case in previous reports.
The report also provides key market data, supplemented by further information in Annexes 1
and 2. Market data has been supplied by the NRAs on the basis of a questionnaire compiled
by the Commission’s services. Where tariff data from sources other than the NRAs has been
used, it has been validated directly with the latter. The market data used in the report
shows the situation at 1 August 2003, unless otherwise stated. The annexes are in the form
of a Commission services’ working document.
The data given in this report and the assessments made of regulatory and market issues are
based on a format that has evolved since the first such report was issued in May 1997. In par-
ticular, data is presented in a way that has responded to the need to give an overview of mar-
ket developments in fifteen Member States in an easily accessible form. In some cases, in
particular in relation to the rollout of broadband networks, it has been subject to discussion in
the Communications Committee. This presentation is without prejudice to any action the
Commission may decide in the framework of its responsibilities under the Treaty or the
directives adopted pursuant thereto, including Article 7 of the Framework Directive. It
                                                
11 Commission Directive 2002/77/EC of 16 September 2002 on competition in the markets for electronic
communications networks and services. OJ L 249, 17.9.2002, p. 21.
12 As regards Spain, the analysis reflects the latest drafts made available to the Commission prior to the
adoption of the legislation by the Parliament on 16 October 2003.8
should also not be considered to carry any implications for the definition of relevant markets
or the market analysis to be carried out by the NRAs.
3. MARKET DEVELOPMENTS
3.1. Electronic communications services market
The market will experience a growth of between 3.7% and 4.7% in 2003, in a stabilising
macroeconomic framework.
The electronic communications market will grow this year at an estimated rate of between
3.7%
13 and 4.7%
14 in nominal terms. This compares with a forecast rate of EU GDP growth of
0.8% (3% in nominal terms) for 2003. The combined national markets of the 15 Member
States will be worth an estimated € 251 billion in 2003.
15
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3.2. Mobile telephony
Continued success of mobile telephony
There were 305.6 million mobile users in the EU as at 1 August 2003. The number of mobile
subscribers has increased at a higher rate than in 2002 (6%), and 81% of EU citizens now
have a mobile telephone. For the first time in one EU Member State, Luxembourg, the total
number of mobile telephones (pre-paid and subscribers) is higher than the population
(115 telephones per 100 population).
Luxembourg is also the country that has experienced the strongest increase in the number of
subscribers (+16%), followed by Denmark, a country that also shows a high penetration rate
(84%). A number of Member States where the penetration rate is close to 90% have also ex-
perienced significant increases in this value since last year, of between 7% and 10%. This
contrasts with the situation in Belgium and the Netherlands, which (with the exception of
France, at 66%) present the lowest penetration rate (73% and 74% respectively) and annual
growth rates among the lowest (2% in the Netherlands, 4% in Belgium).
                                                
13 Source: EITO (European Information technology Observatory) 2003, Update October.
14 Source: IDATE.
15 These figures include revenues from CaTV services and are therefore not comparable with the numbers
presented in previous reports. The five segments included are telephone services, internet and online
services, mobile telephone services, switched data and leased-lines services and CaTV services.9
The market share of the subsidiary of the incumbent operator has increased in three Member
States, with reductions in the other twelve. As a result, the market share of the leading
16 op-
erators has gone down slightly to 46.7% of subscribers.
There are two clearly defined periods in the development of mobile telephony in the EU in the
period 1998-2003. The first was characterised by very rapid penetration, with annual in-
creases in the EU penetration rate of around 20%. In this same period competitors gained
most of their customers to the detriment of the subsidiary of the incumbent (or the leading
operator in the case of the United Kingdom) and in 2000 there was a 50-50 market share split
between incumbents and new entrants. In the second period, starting in 2000, the subsidiary of
the incumbent continued to lose market share, but at a much slower pace (with shares of 50%
in 2000, 48% in 2001, and 47% in 2002).
In 2003, in line with the trend to maintain positions in the market, the variation in the market
share of the leading operator has been less significant (0.5%).
Work is well under way to bring third generation (‘3G’) mobile technology, applications and
services to the wider market and the first commercial launch in Europe of 3G services oc-
curred in the first half of 2003. 3G subscriptions are estimated at around 375 000 in Italy,
195 000 in the United Kingdom, 12 000 in Sweden and 10 000 in Austria. Guidance in this
area was provided by the Commission which adopted two exemption decisions
17 in April and
July 2003 which set out how far mobile operators in Germany and the United Kingdom can
cooperate through network sharing.
Data on interconnection for call termination on mobile networks is provided in the section on
interconnection, below. As regards international roaming tariffs, the Commission continues its
enquiry into their compatibility with the EU competition rules.
EU mobile subscribers and average penetration, 1998-2003
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16 Apart from the United Kingdom, the leading operator is a subsidiary of the incumbent fixed network
operator.
17 Commission Decision of 30  April 2003 in Case No.  COMP/38.370 -  O2 UK  Limited/T-Mobile UK
Limited (‘UK Network Sharing Agreement’), OJ  L200, 7.8.2003, p.  59. Commission Decision of
16 July 2003 in Case No. COMP/38.369 T-Mobile Deutschland/O2 Germany: Network Sharing Rah-
menvertrag, not yet published.10
3.3. Broadband
Significant increase in the number of broadband lines but impact of new entrants still
limited
Broadband roll-out in the EU
There were 17.5  million broadband
18 connections in the EU at the end of June  2003.
12.46 million of these connections were DSL lines (71% of the total), while 4.1 million were
cable modem access lines (24% of the total). The remaining 0.9 million lines (5%) used other
technologies, mostly satellite and fibre.
Broadband connections have almost doubled from the 9 million broadband lines available in
July 2002. Growth has been more intensive in the period from January to July 2003, when
more than 25 000 new broadband lines were being added daily.
EU broadband lines, July 2002 - July 2003
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Competition on the broadband market
Alternative operators can provide broadband services through proprietary alternative plat-
forms or using the incumbent’s network.
Cable access is at present the main alternative technological platform used by new operators
to provide broadband access, but this option is feasible only in those countries where CATV
networks, which need to be upgraded, are already deployed.
In the countries where alternative technological platforms (cable in particular) are not devel-
oped, the deployment of the DSL technology depends on the use of facilities and networks in
the hands of incumbent operators. The EU regulation on broadband access has therefore fo-
cussed on unbundled access to the local loop
19 (fully unbundled local loop and shared access
to the local loop) and on different forms of network access
20 (bitstream and resale), in both
cases aiming at facilitating market entry and developing competition in the high speed access
                                                
18 Broadband capacity: capacity equal to or higher than 144 Kbit/s.
19 Obligation for SMPs to publish a reference offer for unbundled access (RUO) to their local loops and
related facilities. Prices for unbundled access must be cost oriented.
20 Obligation for SMPs to provide special network access facilities and information to others under the
same conditions and of the same quality as they provide for their own services or those of their subsidi-
aries or partners.11
market. As indicated in the 8
th Implementation Report, the Commission has stressed the com-
plementary role of full unbundling, shared access and bitstream access in the process of over-
coming the limited competition in local access and developing broadband access.
The rise in the number of broadband lines has been boosted by DSL and cable modem lines,
although the predominance of DSL technologies has increased, from 67.6% of all lines in
July 2002 to 71.1% this year. With regard to DSL lines, it appears that new entrants’ market
entry is starting to pick up but its impact is still limited. In July 2002, 85.6% of DSL lines
were in the hands of the incumbents. In July 2003 this had gone down to 77%. New entrants
market share taking into account all broadband technologies is improving in Spain, France,
Italy, Finland and Sweden. In Belgium, Denmark, the Netherlands, Portugal and the United
Kingdom the incumbent appears to be re-gaining market share and in Germany the incumbent
still retains 93% of total broadband lines. In general, the competitive situation in broadband is
weaker where there is a lack of competition from alternative platforms such as cable. The
Commission will actively monitor the development of competition in this sector and will in-
tervene where appropriate to protect competition.
On 16 July 2003, the Commission adopted a decision
21 relating to a proceeding under Arti-
cle 82 of the Treaty, in which it found that France Télécom’s subsidiary Wanadoo was en-
gaged in predatory pricing for retail ADSL. The abuse ended in October 2002 with the entry
into force of new wholesale prices charged by France Telecom, more than 30% down on the
previous prices charged. Since then the French high-speed Internet access market has been
growing much more rapidly and in a more balanced way.
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21 Commission Decision of 16 July 2003 in Case No. COMP/38.233 – Wanadoo Interactive. ‘High-speed
Internet: the Commission imposes a fine on Wanadoo for abuse of a dominant position’ - Commission
Press Release IP/03/1025.12
Unbundling of the local loop
With regard to unbundling, 828  000 new lines were taken up between July  2002 and
July 2003, whereas only 400 000 lines had been unbundled between October 2001 and Octo-
ber 2002. This significant increase has not been brought about by full unbundling only, as was
the case in previous years, and the 171 000 shared lines available now represent 6% of all new
entrants’ DSL lines, against 1.5% in October 2002. The development of local loop unbundling
is still rather unbalanced across the EU and is only just starting to take off. Germany accounts
for more than 63% of the unbundled lines
22 and more than 95% per cent of the unbundled
lines are concentrated in six countries (Germany, Italy, Denmark, Finland, the Netherlands
and Sweden). In the other Member States local loop unbundling remains at a very low level.
Despite the improvement in the number of fully unbundled lines, only 19% of new entrants’
retail broadband access lines using the incumbent’s network are fully unbundled lines. Resale
is the most commonly used way (51% of new entrants’ DSL lines), followed by bitstream ac-
cess (24.3%). Between July 2002 and July 2003 there were 1 660 000 new resale lines in the
wholesale market, twice as many as the number of fully unbundled lines.
Prices charged for unbundling have decreased over the last year, and the average EU monthly
total cost for full unbundling (monthly rental plus the connection fee amortised over a year) is
now € 19.4, 9.5% cheaper than in 2002. Price reduction has been more significant for shared
access, at 28%, with the EU average monthly price going down from € 15.9 in 2002 to € 11.4
this year. This might help to explain the 241% rise in the number of shared access lines
provided by the new entrants to their customers between January and July, admittedly from a
very low base. This increase is concentrated in 5 countries (Denmark, France, Netherlands,
Finland and Sweden). Price reductions may have helped to foster the spread of unbundled
lines.
Despite price reductions for full unbundling in Germany, the Commission adopted a deci-
sion
23 on 21 May 2003 under Article 82 of the Treaty regarding Deutsche Telekom’s pricing
strategy for local access to the fixed telephony network. In that decision, the Commission
found that Deutsche Telekom was engaging in a margin squeeze by charging new entrants
higher fees for wholesale access to the local loop than what subscribers had to pay for retail
lines. This decision demonstrates that the Commission will take action under the anti-trust
rules, in order to preserve long-term competitiveness on the market.
                                                
22 It should be noted that not all of the fully unbundled lines are used for the provision of broadband serv-
ices. In Germany, only around 20 per cent of the unbundled lines are used for this purpose.
23 Commission Decision of 21 May 2003 in cases No. COMP/37.451, 37.578 and 37.579: ‘Price squeeze
for local loop access in Germany’ - Commission Press Release IP/03/717.13
Monthly EU average total cost per full unbundled loop and number of full 
unbundled lines, 2002-2003
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Broadband penetration in the EU
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Data for the US: EC estimates
Ranking the EU countries according to broadband penetration rate, which is measured as the
total number of broadband lines per 100 population, can help to analyse the evolution of the
EU broadband market. Three countries are excluded from this breakdown due either to the
lack of data for 2002 (Luxembourg) or to the very limited presence of broadband lines in the
market (Greece and Ireland).
a) Countries with a penetration rate around 10%
As at July 2003, the Member States with the highest penetration level were Belgium, Den-
mark, the Netherlands and Sweden, with a penetration rate of around 10%. These countries
already topped the league a year ago and they all have had the highest increases (an increase
of 2.7 percentage points on average) in the penetration rates in the past 12 months. The popu-
lation of these countries varies from 5 to10 million.
With the exception of Denmark, where 70% of the broadband lines are DSL lines, in the other
three countries there appears to be facilities-based competition. Alternative operators use pro-
prietary platforms (CATV networks mainly) that were already deployed for the provision of
TV signals. Incumbents’ share of the overall broadband market varies according to the use of
alternative platforms and it is hence lower than the EU average.
It can be observed from the data that in Belgium and the Netherlands, where facilities-based
competition exists, new entrants seem to have fewer incentives to enter the DSL market and14
incumbents’ share of the DSL lines market is higher than the EU average. More than 84% of
DSL lines are in the hands of the incumbent while the EU average is 77%.
b) Countries with a penetration rate between 4% and 7%
The second group is made up of Germany, Spain, France and the United Kingdom, with a
penetration rate of around 4%, along with Austria and Finland where the penetration rate is
almost 7%. The penetration rate in this second group increased by approximately 2 percentage
points. The rise in the number of broadband lines has been led by DSL connections, with the
exception of Austria and Spain.
In Austria and the United Kingdom there exists an alternative platform and DSL represents
40% of the total broadband lines. In these two countries the incumbents have maintained their
overall broadband market share, which is around 30%. It is worth noting that in the United
Kingdom the incumbent’s share of DSL lines is the lowest in the EU, while in Austria it is
above the EU average.
On the other hand, DSL is the predominant technology in Spain, France and Finland, where it
accounts for 70% to 80% of all broadband lines, as well as in Germany, where 99% of the
broadband lines are DSL. Alternative operators in the former countries have gained some
market share (7% on average), while in Germany the incumbent has kept control of the
broadband market (93% of all lines).
c) Countries with a penetration rate below 3%
The countries in the third group have a penetration rate of around 2.6%. The growth in the
penetration rate has been slower (1.5 percentage points) than in other countries. In Portugal
there is technological competition, although in this country the incumbent provides broadband
access using both DSL and cable. In Italy 88% of all broadband connections are DSL lines. In
line with the rest of the EU, the preponderance of DSL has augmented in the last months and
new operators have gained 4% of the broadband market.
3.4. Fixed telecommunications operators
Introduction of competition and progressive liberalisation of a former monopoly sector
After the massive entry into the market that characterised the first stage of liberalisation
(+113% between 1998 and 2001), the number of operators authorised to offer public tele-
communication services in Europe has started to decrease. In August 2003 there were in the
EU a total of 1  202 operators authorised to offer public voice telephony (269  local and
933  national operators) and 1  484 public network operators (555  local and 929  national
operators).
Since August 2002 the number of potential players has remained more or less stable for the
voice telephony market, while the number of public network operators has decreased by 5%.
24
The weakness of the general economy has discouraged new operators from entering the mar-
ket, and has caused some bankruptcies and stimulated intensive merger activity. It should be
underlined that the target of the great majority of new entrants has been the business market,
                                                
24 The peak in the number of authorised operators was reached in 2001 with 1 352 operators authorised to
provide voice telephony services and 1 583 public network operators.15
notwithstanding the fact that it has suffered heavily from the consequences of the present
stagnation of the economy. The operators remaining in the market have started to reorganise
their activities, streamline their operations and focus on their core markets. Only the big
groups, which are usually present in both mobile and fixed markets, have continued to target
the mass fixed market.
The number of authorised operators indicates only the potential for competition in the market,
rather than the current level of competition. Among the 1 202 operators legally authorised to
provide voice telephony in the EU (in the sense that they have an individual li-
cence/authorisation or they are subject to a notification/registration procedure), less than half
(around 500) have started operations, the majority only in some local areas or for business us-
ers. It should in particular be noted that one third of operators effectively providing local calls
are local operators only.
The real number of competitors in each national fixed mass market is thus considerably
lower than both the number of authorised operators and the number of active operators. Gen-
erally speaking there are in the great majority of EU countries no more than 3-4 large com-
peting players for public voice telephony.
3.5. Fixed voice telephony market share
Dismantling monopolies
The recent period of economic weakness of the market has influenced the commercial strate-
gies of the operators, which now aim mostly at maintaining the positions acquired during past
years of market growth.
25 This is particularly evident for the international voice telephony
market which, experienced strong competition during the first stage of liberalisation. The
incumbent’s share of this market decreased by 15% in some countries in the period
1999-2000, but is now decreasing at a slower pace (on average by 2.5% a year in the EU since
December 2000), and stood at 62% in December 2002.
The EU incumbents’ average
26 market share on the long distance calls market segment now
also appears to have stabilised at around 70%. Between December 2000 and December 2001
there was a reduction of 3.3%, while since last year the reduction has been only 1.6%.
27
EU incumbents’ average market share on the calls to mobile segment (69% in December
2002) is also diminishing at a lower rate than in the past, even if competitive pressure is still
present. It decreased in absolute terms by 6.6% for the period December 2000-2001 and only
by 4% for the period December 2001-2002.
Some of the competitive pressure now seems to have moved to the local call market (which
includes both local phone calls and local calls to Internet) and, during the period Decem-
ber 2001-2002, there was a reduction in the incumbents’ market share from 87% to 81%. The
reason for this is probably the introduction of carrier pre-selection (CPS) in all the Member
States, and more effective implementation, which has increased the number of customers that
                                                
25 Data are not comparable with the previous reports, due to several factors: (1) figures for the years 2000
and 2001 have been updated to reflect revised data received from Member States; (2) the EU average is
now a weighted, rather than a simple average.
26 Weighted average on the basis of retail revenues.
27 Data are not comparable with the previous reports, due to several factors: (1) figures for the years 2000
and 2001 have been updated to reflect revised data received from Member States; (2) the EU average is
now a weighted, rather than a simple average.16
have chosen an alternative operator as the default option for all types of calls, including local.
The second reason could be the increasing competition in the Internet market, and the subse-
quent erosion of incumbent’s market share for local calls to Internet.
Moreover, the persistent differences between local and long-distance/international market
share show the difficulties new entrants still face in entering the local market, due to the ac-
cess bottleneck.
It should be noted that in those countries where carrier pre-selection was introduced first, the
incumbent is increasing its focus on customer retention and win-back strategies, which limit
new entrants’ ability to grow their customer base. In Ireland, for example, the initial strong
growth in CPS which saw approximately 10% of PSTN lines become CPS lines within the
first 12 months of operation has now stagnated and the incumbent now estimates that it has
won back approximately 59% of all customers who had moved.
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3.6. Consumer choice
How consumers have benefited from the increased number of operators in the fixed
market
Traditional incumbents’ customers are more and more aware of the possibility of using a
provider alternative to the incumbent, either by dialling a call-by-call prefix (carrier selec-
tion) or by choosing to route all calls by default to the network of an alternative operator
(carrier pre-selection). Direct access is also available to users through alternative operators’
proprietary wire/wireless access or through unbundled local loops leased from the incumbent.
As at August 2003, 33% of EU subscribers used an alternative provider to route long-distance
and international calls, while only 25% were using alternative providers for local calls.
28 At
the same time, direct access from alternative providers was used by 6% of EU subscribers.
Since last year, the percentage of subscribers using an alternative provider has grown by 16%
for direct access, 12% for long-distance/international calls and 39% for local calls. The in-
crease in the use of alternative operators for local calls is partly due to more extensive diffu-
sion of carrier pre-selection. Moreover, despite the tendency to converge there is still a sub-
                                                
28 The use of carrier selection does not exclude the possibility of using the incumbent.17
stantial difference between the use of alternative operators for local calls and for long
distance/international calls.
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3.7. Interconnection
Fair use of the incumbent’s network
Fixed-to-fixed interconnection
The state of interconnection services, especially the level of charges, has an overwhelming
effect on the potential for competitive entry in the market and on the sustainability of compe-
tition between undertakings providing electronic communications services. All three segments
detailed here are essential elements for ensuring the continuation of competitive pressure on
undertakings with significant market power, thus indirectly influencing the quality and price
level of the retail products provided on the basis of these interconnection services.
Interconnection therefore remains a focus of regulatory efforts.
Since August 2000, the EU weighted average charge for call termination on fixed networks
has decreased by 32% for single transit, by 22% at local level, and by 16% for double transit.
This happened mostly in the period up to August 2002; during the past year the level of inter-
connection charges seems to have stabilised (around 5% less for the retail and single transit
levels; –3% less for double transit). Price differences between countries are still significant, in
particular at the double transit level, and even seem to have increased over the past three
years.
The major changes since last year have been the significant decrease in Luxembourg (–29%
for local and single transit and –20% for double transit), in Denmark (–17% for local transit
and –28% for double transit) and in Italy and Ireland, where there has been a general decrease
of 14% and 10% respectively at all levels of interconnection.
The interconnection charge for double transit has significantly increased in Greece (+35%),
which bought it up to the second highest position.18
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Interconnection for call termination on mobile networks
In August 2003 the EU weighted average interconnection charge for terminating a call on mo-
bile networks was 15.93 euro-cents for the 16 European mobile operators declared by the
NRA as having significant market power on the national market for interconnection (SMP). It
was 18.98 euro-cents for the remaining 34  mobile operators (covering 55% of the EU
market).
The difference in charges between the two classes of operators has arisen mostly during the
past year as a result of regulatory intervention by NRAs to bring about cost orientated charges
for SMP operators. Since August 2002, average interconnection charges for SMP operators
has decreased by 15.3%, while for non-SMP operators has increased slightly.
The main decreases in the charges since then have been achieved in Italy (-25% for one SMP
operator), in France and Spain (around –18% for both SMP operators), in Ireland (-13% for
one SMP operator), in Belgium (-14% for one SMP operator), and in Greece, where charges
have decreased on average by 9% for the four non-SMP operators, after intervention by the
NRAs.
On the other hand, fixed–to–mobile interconnection charges have increased in the
Netherlands by 10% for one operator.
The difference between the level of the charges for SMP and non-SMP operators can be ex-
plained by the increased number of SMP operators (which now account for 45% of EU sub-
scribers compared to 41% in 2002), but mostly by the cost orientation requirement for inter-
connection charges on SMP operators. It should be noted that even for non-SMP operators
29,
interconnection charges are sometimes set by the NRAs , for example as a result of interven-
tion on the basis of a competition enquiry or to set a price ceiling to avoid excessive tariffs.
Furthermore, in some countries NRAs intervene in setting the charges for non-SMP operators
in order, for example, to resolve a dispute between market players.It should be noted that
although there has been a decrease in the interconnection charges, their level remains on
average more than 9 times higher than the average fixed–to–fixed interconnection charges
(double transit).
                                                
29 At the moment there are no operators designated with SMP on the national interconnection market in
6 countries: Germany, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Austria, Portugal and United Kingdom.19
Leased lines interconnection
Leased lines are used by network operators and service providers as the basic transport infra-
structure upon which their services are built, and by large business users as the means of
linking their locations world-wide for the transport of internal voice and data communications
traffic.
New entrants are not always able to provide complete end–to–end leased lines to meet all
their customers’ needs, and often have to rely on the incumbent to provide a short–distance
leased circuit to link the customer’s premises to the new entrant’s network (a ‘leased line part
circuit’).
Under the Leased Lines
30 and Interconnection Directives
31, national regulatory authorities
were required to impose obligations for transparency, non–discrimination, and cost-orienta-
tion on certain services, including leased line services, provided by operators notified as
having significant market power.
Ceilings for monthly rental prices of leased line part circuits provided by notified operators
have been applied between 1999 and 2002. These prices were defined by comparing the data
of notified operators in all Member States and identifying the Member State with the third
lowest price, which determined the value of the ceiling.
32
With regard to 64 Kbit/s and 2 Mbit/s, the EU average price has decreased since 2001. This
reduction has been progressive in the 64 Kbit/s circuits over the period 2001–2003, whilst it
was more significant between 2001 and 2002 in the case of 2 Mbit/s circuits. The deviation
from the price ceiling for 2 Mbit/s circuits has dropped from 46.50% to 7.3%. In real terms
this means that the weighted average price for the monthly rental of a 2 Mbit/s leased line part
circuit has gone down from € 512.75 in 2001 to € 375.54.
With reference to 34 Mbit/s circuits, the EU weighted average price in 2002 was at the level
of the third lowest price. This means that there were significant price reductions between 2001
and 2002. These price reductions have continued this year, from an average price of € 2 023
in 2001 to € 1 636 in 2003 for the 2 km circuits and from € 2 933 to € 2 250 in the case of
5 km circuits.
However, considerable concerns with regard to the price level remain. For 64 Kbit/s circuits,
prices in 10 Member States are still above the ceiling established in 1999, for 2 Mbit/s circuits
prices in 7 Member States and for 34 Mbit/s circuits prices in 3 Member States are still above
those ceilings.
Also, the variation of prices for leased line part circuits across Member States remains very
high when compared to retail leased line prices. For the different capacities considered, the
                                                
30 Council Directive 92/44/EEC of 5 June 1992 on the application of Open Network Provision to leased
lines (OJ  L  165, 19.6.1992, p. 27), as last amended by Commission Decision 80/98/EC (OJ  L  14,
20.1.1998, p. 27).
31 Directive 97/33/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 30 June 1997 on interconnection
in Telecommunications with regard to ensuring universal service and interoperability through applica-
tion of the principles of Open Network Provision (ONP) (OJ L 199, 26.7.1997, p. 32), as amended by
Directive 98/61/EC (OJ L 268, 3.10.1998, p. 37).
32 Although the ceiling is not used anymore, it has been a very helpful tool to benchmark progress towards
the reduction of leased lines wholesale interconnection prices. It is therefore used in this report in order
to present progress.20
price in the Member State with the highest price is up to 15 times higher than in the Member
State with the lowest price. With regard to delivery times, there are also wide variations be-
tween Member States, as shown in the Leased Lines Report 2002.
33
3.8. Fixed telephony tariffs
Competition in the sector has resulted in lower tariffs for consumers
34
The dynamic of fixed voice telephony tariffs highlighted in previous Reports has continued in
2003. While the downward trend has been maintained, the pace in 2003 is significantly slower
than in previous years and less than half of that reported in 2002. This trend is common to
both national and international calls.
National calls – data from the national basket
This assessment is based on data from the Teligen/OECD basket.
35 Reduction rates were
higher in the years immediately after the liberalisation of the fixed voice telephony market i.e.
1998; since 2000, the pace of reduction has decreased significantly. Between 2002 and 2003,
the average monthly expenditure for national calls of a residential and a business user (this
category includes local and long distance calls and fixed charges) went down by 0.3% and
0.5% respectively. In the five-year period since the opening of the voice telephony markets,
the EU weighted monthly expenditure for national calls by residential users decreased by
13.5%; over the same period, the overall reduction in EU weighed monthly expenditure for
national calls by business users almost doubled, at 22.7%.
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33 COCOM03-42.
34 Detailed information on fixed tariffs (including line rental) and mobile tariffs (including mobile to
mobile) can be found in Annex  1 and also in the DG  Information Society Tariffs Annual Report
http://europa.eu.int/information_society/topics/telecoms/regulatory/studies/documents/tariff_report_200
2_12.pdf
35 The OECD basket methodology allows the calculation of the average monthly expenditure of a standard
European consumer. The user is assumed to be using national PSTN service from the incumbent op-
erator. The OECD national PSTN basket structure covers 14 distances (3 km to 490 km) and 6 times of
day (4 at weekdays and 2 at weekends), all with individual weights. Call duration is varied over the
distances and time of day. Fixed charges are included with the appropriate annual rental charge, and
1/5 of the installation charge.21
International calls – data from the international basket
36
Between 2003 and 2002 there has been a decrease of 4% in the average cost of an interna-
tional call for residential users, marginally higher than the reduction reported between 2002
and 2001. The average cost decreased from € 0.7 to € 0.67 (including VAT). As regards the
average cost of an international call for business users, the reduction is similar to that of resi-
dential calls (4%), with an average price of € 0.98 (excluding VAT). The overall reduction for
the period 1998–2003 of the average cost of an international call has been substantial, that is
45% for business users and 42% for residential users.
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3.9. Numbering
Impact of number portability in increasing competition in the fixed and mobile markets
Mobile number portability (MNP) only became compulsory in the EU with the entry into
force of the new regulatory framework on 25 July 2003. However, most Member States had
already introduced MNP in advance to develop competition on the mobile market. This has
proved particularly successful in some Member States: as many as 11% of mobile numbers
are ported in Denmark, 5% in the Netherlands, Sweden and the United Kingdom. In absolute
numbers, around 6 million numbers are ported in Europe, which represents about 2% of all
mobile numbers. Austria is the only country where MNP is not available: secondary legisla-
tion has recently been adopted, but mobile numbers will probably not be able to be ported -
until some time in 2004.
Mobile number portability is a key tool in fostering competition on a market where the num-
ber of players is limited. Until now, the need to change numbers acted as the biggest deterrent
for consumers to change operator. As a result of the removal of this constraint, prices should
gradually decrease in Member States, benefiting from more intense competition.
                                                
36 The international PSTN basket, when used separately, shall reflect the cost of a single call, calculated
according to the weighting method described below. No fixed charges are included.
The basket calculates an average charge for calls to all OECD destination countries. The charge is
calculated as the average of:
  Call duration Residential basket weight Business basket weight
Peak time call 3 minutes 25% 75%
Off-peak time call 5 minutes 75% 25%22
Fixed number portability (FNP) is a good indicator of the intensity of competition in fixed
telephony services. It is only starting to make an impact on the market in some Member
States. Again, Denmark leads the way with 13% of numbers ported; Belgium (11%), the
Netherlands (7%) and Spain (4%) are also doing well. In Italy and France, FNP has been ap-
plied to a limited amount of numbers, but has picked up rapidly (5 times more numbers in
2003 than in 2002).
The success of FNP seems to be directly linked to the charge imposed by the incumbent op-
erator for porting numbers. In all Member States where FNP is making significant progress,
the charge does not exceed € 10. On the other hand, in Ireland, Austria and Sweden, where the
fee is above € 17, very few numbers are ported.
Fixed ported numbers and price of fixed number portability
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3.10. Digital TV
Digital TV penetration rates in EU (2001 - 2003)
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The EU’s digital TV market has been showing signs of recovery, after the significant slow-
down in growth in the year 2002 (due to the difficult overall situation in the information and
communications sector, characterised by limited availability of capital). Digital TV household
penetration has increased from about 18% to around 22% in the year 2003. The falling price
of set-top boxes (STBs) has increased the appeal of DTTV (digital terrestrial TV) to23
consumers
37 and more coherent approaches to the roll-out of FTA (free–to–air) terrestrial
DTV seem to be proving successful in several Member States (United Kingdom, Finland).
Progress with digital television varies widely across Member States – with penetration levels
that vary from less than 5% to above 50% – although there are still many difficulties in ob-
taining reliable data on growth and penetration rates throughout the EU. Market development
is being delayed for a number of reasons. So far, digital TV has mainly grown on the back of
satellite pay-TV (through the migration of analogue subscribers to digital services) which
combines a multi-channel offer with operators’ subsidies for STBs. However, the growth po-
tential for pay-TV in its current form has its limits (especially in cable TV countries, where
users already have a multi-channel option) and generally the uptake of premium services is
slowing. Financial problems are affecting all platforms, although this is currently most evi-
dent in the case of cable operators. Not the least of the problems is the lack of a forward-
looking, harmonised and co-ordinated strategy between market players and Member States for
implementing DTTV across the EU.
38
The figures regarding the development of different delivery platforms indicate that digital sat-
ellite TV still remains the main delivery mechanism and represents about 70% of the overall
DTV market, while more than 65% of satellite households are digitised. Satellite DTV pene-
tration is still increasing and FTA (free to air) digital satellite is now having significant im-
pact. Digital cable TV represents less than 20% of the overall DTV market and only about
13% of cable households are digitised. The current financial difficulties faced by cable op-
erators across Europe, coupled with the fact that their subscribers already enjoy multi-channel
choice within the analogue medium and the lack of a clearly identifiable strategy for cable
DTV roll-out, has led to only modest cable DTV deployment, as compared with the United
States where cable has played a major role.
39 The penetration rate for DTTV has improved,
doubling to 2.5% of total EU TV households over the past year, mainly thanks to the success-
ful take-up of FTA DTTV in the United Kingdom, following the relaunch of the terrestrial
platform with an exclusively free-to–air service offer. Finland has also achieved a strong
launch for FTA DTTV. Although satellite, cable and terrestrial are the main platforms for the
delivery of digital television, new technologies are evolving, such as digital television over
ADSL, which has already been introduced in some Member States. However, the penetration
rates for DSL TV are still very low and do not exceed 1% of total EU TV households.
4. STATUS OF TRANSPOSITION IN THE MEMBER STATES
The information in this section sets out the main concerns relating to transposition of the key
issues in the new regulatory framework, arising from an initial assessment of the transposition
measures adopted so far and the draft transposition measures available in some Member
States. It inevitably presents an incomplete picture and constitutes only a preliminary and
provisional view on the issues concerned.
                                                
37 Recall that digital terrestrial normally offers around 30 channels against 100 or more channels available
on digital satellite or cable platforms.
38 For more information on status of digital Television in the EU and some policy options see: Communi-
cation from the Commission to the Council, the European Parliament, the European Economic and So-
cial Committee and the Committee of Regions on the transition from analogue to digital broadcasting
(from digital ‘switchover’ to ‘analogue switch-off’), COM(2003) 541 final, 17 September 2003.
39 However, the US industry is much more concentrated than the European one; 10 operators control 85%
of cable subscribers.24
4.1. Framework Directive
The Framework Directive
40 contains the rules and the principles that apply horizontally to all
the activities covered by the other, specific directives which make up the new regulatory
framework. It focuses particularly on the responsibilities and powers of the NRAs, since they
are the foundation of the new regulatory system.
Key issues for transposition:
  The objectives for NRA action established at EU level should be fully reflected in national
laws, as should the requirement that NRAs act independently of operators and impartially;
  The full range of powers available to NRAs under the new framework must also be avail-
able to them as a matter of national law;
  It is important that the various tasks attributed to NRAs should be clearly identified, so that
operators and users know who is responsible for dealing with any particular problem;
  Member States must ensure that there are effective mechanisms for appeal and dispute
resolution;
  National laws should ensure the timely completion of the implementation process, par-
ticularly as regards the NRAs’ first market reviews;
  National legislation should contribute to transparency in the sector by ensuring that the
requirements of the framework regarding the public provision of relevant information on
the market and its regulatory conditions are fulfilled.
Main concerns:
–  In certain Member States there is no explicit transposition of the requirements of the
Framework Directive as to the NRAs’ independence from operators or their impartiality;
–  The attribution of NRA tasks between different national bodies is not always clear;
–  In some cases national laws would appear to limit the NRA’s ability to exercise the full
range of powers contemplated by the framework;
–  The aims of the framework could also be put at risk if the NRAs do not act in a timely
manner once they have the requisite powers under national law. In some countries the leg-
islation may fail to provide a time limit for carrying out the first market reviews or provide
only a very extended one.
National regulatory authorities
–  Clear attribution of NRA tasks
Each Member State is free to decide which body within its territory is to carry out the tasks
attributed to an NRA under the new framework. Consequently there may be more than one
designated NRA within a Member State. However, because of the risk of confusion as to who
                                                
40 Directive 2002/21/EC: see footnote 9 above.25
does what, the Framework Directive requires that each task is assigned to a competent body
and that, where tasks are assigned to more than one body, the tasks undertaken by each must
be published in an easily accessible form.
In some countries the powers accorded to a NRA under the new framework are so widely dis-
persed between different national bodies (including in some cases the ‘government’ itself),
that the effective exercise and co-ordination of those powers may be in doubt. This can also
give rise to a lack of clarity as to how potentially overlapping responsibilities will be shared.
In some countries the separate treatment of television and radio broadcasting regulation from
the regulation of electronic communications networks and services generally means that there
is a risk that some activities (e.g. cable networks and internet access services) could be subject
to double regulation.
In some Member States which have adopted legislation, there is no clear requirement to pub-
lish in easily accessible form the different tasks of the NRA(s). It is questionable whether the
attribution of tasks within the legislation itself will be sufficient to fulfil this requirement.
–  Independence and impartiality of NRA
In most Member States the independence of the NRA from all organisations providing elec-
tronic communications networks, equipment or services is now assured, since it was also a
key element of the previous regulatory framework.
With regard to NRAs’ exercise of their powers, it is noteworthy that in the draft legislation
under discussion in one Member State, a number of key decisions require the consent of offi-
cials in the NRA appointed by the Ministry.
In some Member States the draft legislation would introduce a mechanism for review of the
NRA’s decisions by the Ministry and certain tasks have also been transferred from the NRA
to the Ministry.
In certain Member States there is no explicit transposition of the requirements of the Frame-
work Directive as to the NRAs’ independence from operators or its impartiality. In some
cases, however, such independence or impartiality may be ensured by general principles of
administrative law or in other pieces of legislation.
–  NRAs’ powers to act
In some countries which have transposed the framework, it appears that some powers have
not been explicitly conferred on the NRA. For example in one case there is no express power
for the NRA to impose publication of a reference offer or transparency of internal transfer
pricing; in another the power for the NRA to intervene on its own initiative to secure the ob-
jectives of the new framework does not seem to be transposed.
In another Member State, the draft law seems to spell out in detail the remedies that can be
imposed by an NRA following its market analysis, potentially limiting its discretion to deter-
mine which is the most appropriate remedy in a particular set of circumstances. The power of
the NRA to apply certain remedies is also restricted in some cases (e.g. transparency and non-
discrimination), even if significant market power has been found in the relevant market.
The ability of NRAs to take proper account of the comments of the Commission and other
NRAs in the Article 7 process will also be constrained if primary legislation predetermines26
the nature of the remedies to be imposed as a result of a finding of SMP in a particular
market.
On the other hand in another Member State which has adopted legislation, the discretionary
powers of the NRA are so widely drafted that in some instances the question arises whether
certain mandatory requirements under the new framework have been fully transposed into
law.
–  Regulatory Objectives
The Directive requires Member States to ensure that, in carrying out their regulatory tasks,
NRAs take account of the objectives enshrined therein, namely that they promote competition
to the maximum benefit of users, contribute to the development of the internal market and
promote the interests of EU citizens.
In some Member States which have adopted legislation, the objectives enshrined in the na-
tional legislation do not directly reflect the regulatory objectives set out in Article  8 of
Framework Directive. In some cases this is because the regulatory objectives provided for
have been significantly reformulated (perhaps to reflect the legislative culture or traditions of
the country concerned) and in others it seems that some objectives have simply been omitted
from the national legislation. As a result it is not always easy to determine whether the neces-
sary objectives have been adequately transposed.
A similar problem arises in some countries which have not used the same definitions in their
national transposition measures as are used in the Framework Directive. This makes an as-
sessment of the conformity of the national provisions with Community law considerably more
difficult.
Likewise the draft laws of some Member States do not expressly mention certain of the ob-
jectives contained in Article 8.
–  Co-operation between NRA and National Competition Authority
In one country which has adopted legislation, there is no provision in the sector-specific leg-
islation requiring co-operation between NRA and national competition authority, although co-
operation between all authorities is provided for in general administrative legislation.
–  Appeals
In two Member States it is not clear from the transposing legislation whether a proper appeal
mechanism exists from decisions of local authorities that relate to the grant of rights of way.
In some cases decisions stand pending appeal only if there is a specific order by the NRA to
that effect, whereas the Framework Directive requires that decisions should stand unless the
appeal body decides otherwise.
While Member States have a discretion (as discussed above) in determining which national
bodies should carry out the individual tasks of an NRA, the Framework Directive nevertheless
requires that the decisions of those bodies in exercising their assigned tasks should be subject
to appeal, by any user or undertaking providing electronic communications networks and/or
services who is affected by them, to a body that is independent of the parties involved. Al-
though such appeal mechanisms normally exist with respect to the decisions of the authority
which is responsible for the day–to–day supervision of the electronic communications mar-27
kets, it is less clear how this requirement is met when another body has been designated as an
NRA in respect of a particular task, such as a Ministry or even ‘the government’.
Market analysis and review of obligations
–  Timely and effective market reviews
It is in the interests of consistency and fairness that the process of market analysis and review
of existing regulatory obligations be completed across the EU as soon as possible after the
date from which the new framework was due to be applied by the Member States (25 July
2003). This process has already been undermined by the failure of a number of Member
States to transpose the new framework on time. It could also be further put at risk if the NRAs
do not act in a timely manner once they have the requisite powers under national law. In some
countries there is no time limit provided by the legislation for carrying out the first market
reviews or there is a very extended time limit. This can be contrasted with another Member
State which requires the market reviews to be completed within a specified number of days
after entry into force of the national law.
–  Consistency with Recommendation and Guidelines
It is also important that NRAs act in a co-ordinated manner when exercising their powers un-
der the new framework. This is why the Framework Directive stresses the need for co-opera-
tion and consultation between NRAs across the EU and also requires that they take the utmost
account of guidance issued by the Commission in the form of Recommendations (including
the Recommendation on relevant markets susceptible to ex ante regulation) and the Guide-
lines on market analysis.
There is concern as to the full transposition of these requirements in the Member States, in
particular the requirement to take ‘utmost account’ of the Commission’s recommendations.
In one Member State which has adopted legislation, there is no transposition of the require-
ment for the NRA to take utmost account of Recommendations issued by the Commission
under Article 19 of the Framework Directive or to provide reasons if it does not follow a
Recommendation.
The laws of at least two Member States would appear not to ensure that all markets listed in
the Commission's Recommendation on relevant markets will be analysed by the NRA.
–  National consultation procedures (Article 6 Framework Directive)
In one Member State, despite the adoption of transposition measures, the procedures for
national consultation of interested parties on NRA’s decisions require further clarification.
Management of Radio Frequencies
In one Member State which has adopted legislation there appears to be no explicit transposi-
tion of the requirements of Articles 9(1) and 10 of the Framework Directive regarding the
conditions governing the allocation and assignment of frequencies and numbers respectively.
One of the new elements in the Framework Directive is an explicit recognition that Member
States may allow operators to trade the rights they hold to use frequencies, under the supervi-
sion of the national regulatory authority and subject to certain safeguards. To date six out of28
the eight Member States that have adopted transposition measures have made some provision
in their national law for such secondary trading.
Dispute resolution
In one Member State which has already adopted legislation, it appears that the scope of the
provisions on cross-border dispute resolution (c.f. Article 21 of the Framework Directive) is
limited to matters of access and interconnection, whereas it may be possible that other matters
could be subject to such disputes.
In another there is no provision in the legislation specifically governing the resolution of
cross-border disputes (Article 21 of the Framework Directive).
In another the transposition of exceptions to the four-month time limit for resolving disputes
is drafted in such a manner as to imply more frequent recourse to it than the ‘exceptional cir-
cumstances’ contemplated by Article 20 of the Framework Directive.
In a Member State, the draft law limits the scope of the matters that can be subject to the dis-
pute resolution mechanisms to specified issues, which could therefore leave some other issues
without access to dispute resolution.
Transparency
In a number of Member States there is no express provision dealing with the publication of
information relating to the application of the Directives, as required by Article  24 of the
Framework Directive. It is worth noting that the first publication of a notice as required by
that Article, describing how and where the relevant information has been made available,
should have been made before 25 July 2003, the date for application of the new framework.
In another Member State the draft law does not clarify the requirements relating to provision
of easily accessible information to the public will be satisfied in practice.
4.2. Authorisation Directive
One of the key objectives of the new regulatory framework is to reduce the regulatory burdens
on market access and to ensure a more consistent treatment of operators, both as between
Member States and as between different, but converging, technologies. The Authorisation Di-
rective
41 responds to such a need by creating a legal framework, which ensures the freedom to
provide electronic communications networks and services, subject only to the limited condi-
tions laid down in the Directive.
The 8
th Implementation Report referred to the existence of additional burdens on the sector
which, inter alia, took the form of specific taxes on telecommunications services. In this re-
gard, the European Court of Justice has ruled
42 that  the former Licensing Direc-
tive 97/13/EC
43 (notably its Article 11) prohibited Member States from imposing financial
charges other than and in addition to those allowed by the directive on undertakings which
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hold individual licences in the telecommunications sector, solely because they hold such li-
cences. Although the Licensing Directive was repealed on 25 July 2003, the ruling provides
some guidance for the interpretation of national measures similar to the contested charge (a
levy on the turnover of telecommunications operators) under the new framework, since the
Authorisation Directive contains similar provisions.
Key issues for transposition:
  The provision of electronic communications networks and services is henceforth subject to
general authorisation only and individual rights should exist only for the use of radio fre-
quencies and numbers; conditions imposed must be limited to those laid down in the
Directive;
  Individual rights of use should only be granted, or limited in number, where there is a need
to do so;
  Where the number of rights of use needs to be limited, the procedures and selection criteria
must be transparent and respect the underlying principles of Community law;
  The administrative charges imposed on undertakings should be limited to those required to
recover the actual administrative costs of the NRAs’ activities.
Main concerns:
–  It is important that the conditions attached to the general authorisation and to rights of use
are clearly defined and established under national legislation, to ensure legal certainty for
the undertakings as to their rights and obligations;
–  In certain Member States there is a risk that the procedures or the selection criteria for the
grant of rights of use of radio frequencies may not respect the principles established under
the Directive (transparency, non-discrimination, etc.); in other cases, limits on the number
of rights of use may be imposed even when this is not necessary;
–  In some cases the requirement that any limitation on the number of rights of use of fre-
quencies be reviewed at regular intervals or at the request of affected undertakings may not
be transposed;
–  In some Member States there is uncertainty as to whether the NRA can make adjustments
to balance administrative costs and charges and no clear requirement to publish a yearly
overview of such costs and charges.
Conditions attached to the general authorisation and to rights of use of radio frequencies and
numbers
In some Member States which have adopted legislation, it is not always clear whether the re-
quirement that the conditions of a general authorisation be limited to those in the Annex to the
Directive is fully met. In one case conditions attached to the authorisation or to rights of use
include additional elements than those provided for by the Directive.
In two Member States the draft measures available to the Commission services do not seem to
define the conditions that may be attached to a general authorisation and to rights to use fre-
quencies and numbers. In this regard, secondary legislation would need to be adopted, fol-30
lowing the adoption of the new primary legislation, to provide for the terms and conditions
that can be attached to such authorisations and rights of use.
Rights of use of radio frequencies and numbers, and procedures for limiting the number of
rights of use to be granted for radio frequencies
In one Member State the provisions of the Directive establishing the procedure for limiting
the number of rights of use of radio frequencies do not appear to be fully taken into account.
Elements missing from the transposing legislation concern: i) the requirement that Member
States shall not limit the number of rights of use to be granted except in cases where this is
necessary to ensure the efficient use of frequencies; and ii) the obligation to review the limi-
tation of the number of rights of use at reasonable intervals or at the reasonable request of af-
fected undertakings.
In some Member States, the principles underlying the selection criteria for the grant of rights
of use of radio frequencies (objectivity, non-discrimination and proportionality) do not seem
to be explicitly and fully reflected in the legislation.
The Authorisation Directive acknowledges the possibility that specific criteria and procedures
may be used for the grant of rights of use of radio frequencies to providers of radio or TV
broadcast content services, with a view to pursuing general interest objectives in conformity
with Community law. However, it appears that transposition measures applying such specific
criteria and procedures do not always make clear how they relate to the pursuit of general
interest objectives. Clarity is needed on this point in order to ensure that the requirements of
the Authorisation Directive for open, transparent and non-discriminatory procedures are not
bypassed in areas where they should apply.
In one Member State, the national legislation contains enabling provisions which would rec-
ognise a particular right of access to spectrum for the purposes of reception of signals from
abroad and impose corresponding obligations. These provisions could give rise to the risk of a
fragmented approach to spectrum management across the EU, duplicating and increasing the
burdens on affected operators. In assessing any future national measures implementing this
right of access in relation to specific spectrum bands, the Commission would need to consider
the proportionality of the measures concerned. In particular it would need to consider whether
the principle in the Authorisation Directive has been respected that where possible, in par-
ticular where the risk of harmful interference is negligible, spectrum should not be subject to
individual rights of use.
As regards the time-limits for decisions on rights of use (both numbers and frequencies), it
appears that two Member States do not include the relevant deadlines in their adopted or draft
laws. As regards the time limits in the Authorisation Directive for decisions on the grant of
rights of use of numbers, it appears that in one Member State which has produced draft legis-
lation the relevant deadline will only be set out in forthcoming secondary legislation.
Compliance with the conditions of the general authorisation or of rights of use
In one country the transposition measure seems to provide the possibility for the granting
authority to prohibit the provision of services within sixty days after the notification by the
undertaking of its intention to commence business. The granting authority can take such ac-
tion in the event the applicant does not fulfil the conditions required. This seems to call into
question the proper implementation of the procedural requirements of the Authorisation Di-
rective governing compliance with the conditions of an authorisation or a right of use as well31
as those governing specific obligations regarding access and the provision of universal serv-
ice. Under those provisions NRAs can prohibit an undertaking from providing services only
in cases of serious and repeated breach of the conditions, where measures aimed at ensuring
compliance have failed.
Administrative charges
In order to ensure transparency in relation to the administrative charges imposed on under-
takings, the Directive introduced a requirement for the national regulatory authority to publish
an annual report on the total sum of charges collected and the administrative costs incurred,
and to adjust charges accordingly. In some Member States it is not clear whether the NRA can
make adjustments to balance administrative costs and charges. In one case, the requirement to
publish a yearly overview of administrative costs and charges collected does not seem to be
included in the adopted legislation.
It would appear that the draft legislation in one Member State does not refer explicitly to the
principles which are to govern administrative charges (objectivity, transparency and pro-
portionality).
Existing authorisations
In one Member State the draft law provides that the conditions attached to existing licences
are intended to remain in force until the adoption of a Regulation concerning the modification
of the conditions attached to existing licences.
It is worth noting that in another Member State which has not yet transposed the new frame-
work the NRA has issued guidance to the effect that in general it no longer requires under-
takings to obtain an individual licence for the provision of electronic communications net-
works and services.
4.3. Access and Interconnection Directive
The Access Directive
44 sets out the principles that should govern the exercise by the NRAs of
their powers to oversee and, where necessary, regulate relations between electronic commu-
nications operators, i.e. the wholesale markets in the sector. The purpose of the Access Direc-
tive is to ensure that the relations between operators are left as far as possible to competitive
market forces, while giving flexible powers to the NRAs to intervene where market forces
alone cannot ensure the fulfilment of the policy objectives set out in the Framework Directive.
There is therefore a clear need for NRAs to justify their decisions to impose regulatory obli-
gations on market players and the market analysis procedures established by the new frame-
work provide the key mechanism by which they can do so.
Given the wide degree of discretion accorded to them, NRAs are under a corresponding duty
to co-ordinate their actions at national and Community level and, in particular, to co-operate
with the Commission and the NRAs of other Member States so as to ensure the consistent ap-
plication of the regulatory principles across the EU.
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Key issues for transposition:
  Access and interconnection conditions should be primarily a matter for commercial nego-
tiation, but the NRA must still have power to intervene to ensure the policy objectives of
the framework are met;
  NRAs should be able to apply the full range of remedies with the necessary flexibility to
tailor them to the conditions they find in the relevant market;
  Remedies linked to SMP in the Access Directive should be applied only on the basis of a
market review consistent with competition law;
  NRAs should be empowered to impose other obligations than those listed in the Access
Directive only in justified cases and in accordance with the necessary consultation
procedures.
Main concerns:
–  Some transposition measures would tend to pre-determine the obligations to be imposed on
undertakings with SMP, without regard to the particular competition concerns or circum-
stances found in that market;
–  In some cases legislation would limit the NRA’s power to impose particular obligations
upon a finding of SMP, e.g. requiring an undertaking to have SMP in both a wholesale and
a retail market;
In some Member States there may be a lack of power on the part of the NRA to ensure that
the minimum elements of reference offers are in place and to require changes where
appropriate.
Powers and responsibilities of the NRAs with regard to access and interconnection
–  Ensuring end to end connectivity
The Access Directive envisages that the responsibility for ensuring end to end connectivity
and the accessibility for end-users to digital and radio television broadcasting services, and
the powers with which to do so, should be conferred on the NRAs. This provision does not
seem to be transposed in one Member State which has already adopted its transposition meas-
ures. On the other hand, in two Member States which have not yet transposed the new frame-
work the draft transposition measures appear to envisage that obligations in this field be inte-
grated within the legislative measures themselves. In one case the legislator intends to adopt a
general obligation to interconnect in secondary legislation. This approach raises questions as
to which body constitutes the NRA for the purposes of the specific tasks assigned by the
Access Directive and how the safeguards provided by the new framework will be met, such as
the right of persons affected by decisions of the NRA to be consulted and ultimately to appeal
against them. In the other Member State concerned the draft law would provide for a general
non-discrimination obligation imposed on operators that connect end users. Similar concerns
arise in this case, particularly as it appears that the obligations concerned would be fixed in
primary legislation.
–  NRA’s general power to intervene in access and interconnection matters33
While conditions for access and interconnection should in principle be left to commercial ne-
gotiation, the NRA should have the legal power to intervene – either on its own initiative or at
the request of the parties – in order to secure the policy objectives set out in the Framework
Directive. The power for the NRA to intervene on its own initiative to secure the policy ob-
jectives set out in the Framework Directive appears to be missing in one Member State that
has already transposed the current framework.
Obligations on operators linked to market review procedures
Principles
–  Periodicity of market analysis
There is one Member State among those that have not transposed the framework in which it is
still not clear from the draft legislation what requirements will be imposed on the NRA as to
the timing of its market analyses and review of obligations.
–  Obligation to impose at least one remedy (if the market is not effectively competitive)
Except for requirements applicable generally under the new framework or under special pro-
cedures referred to in Article 8 of the Access Directive, the possibility of imposing remedies
on a given undertaking only arises if an NRA has found that the relevant market is not effec-
tively competitive and that consequently one or more undertakings have significant market
power. Conversely, if an NRA finds that there is a lack of effective competition in a relevant
wholesale market, then it is bound to impose at least one obligation on the operator with SMP
in order to remedy that lack of effective competition. In one Member State that has already
transposed the framework, it is not clear that this requirement is reflected in the legislation. A
similar problem is likely to arise in at least one of those Member States that have not yet
transposed the new framework.
–  Remedy should be linked to the problem identified
In one Member State that has not yet transposed the new framework the legislator seems to
intend to pre-determine which obligations (namely cost orientation and the obligation to
publish a reference offer) are to be imposed on all undertakings found to have SMP, without
regard to the particular competition concerns in that market. Similarly, the local loop unbun-
dling obligation is intended to be embedded in the law. These solutions risk removing the
necessary discretion from the NRA to determine which is the most appropriate remedy based
on the nature of the problem identified.
–  NRAs’ power to apply a full set of remedies
The draft legislation of some Member States does not seem to make available to the NRA the
full range of possible remedies detailed in the Access Directive, thus potentially depriving the
NRA of its ability to apply them. In one of them, the NRA can include cost-orientation in
access obligations only if the operator has SMP in both the access and the end-user markets.
–  NRA power to impose other obligations
To ensure maximum flexibility the Access Directive provides for the possibility that NRAs
may impose obligations other than those set out in the Directive, subject to prior authorisation
by the Commission. In one Member State that has not yet transposed the new framework the
draft legislation envisages that in such an event the NRA must first obtain legislative backing34
for the imposition of a particular obligation by means of secondary legislation. In such a
situation it would appear that the role of NRA is effectively being shared between different
institutions and it will be important to ensure that the safeguards provided by the new frame-
work (such as consultation and appeal mechanisms) are assured.
Specific remedies
–  Transparency
The Access Directive provides that in cases where an NRA has imposed an obligation on an
SMP operator to publish a reference offer it should be in a position to order changes to that
offer. Experience of the implementation of the previous regulatory framework shows that this
power is a crucial one for NRAs. However, a number of Member States have not included this
power for their NRA in their adopted or draft legislation, while another Member State has
provided the NRA with the power to require that a reference offer be made publicly available,
but has not given it the power to require its publication.
In some Member States, which have adopted transposition measures, the current reference un-
bundling offer does not contain all elements set out in the Access Directive or remains to be
established by secondary legislation. On the other hand, the draft law of one Member State
does not contain a definition of unbundling, which means that it does not fulfil the transposi-
tion requirements concerning the minimum elements of a reference unbundling offer.
–  Accounting separation
According to the provisions on accounting separation the NRA should have a power to make
transparent the internal transfer prices of a vertically integrated company. This power is
missing in the adopted or draft laws of at least two Member States.
–  Price control and cost accounting
The Access Directive stipulates that in making decisions on cost accounting and pricing mat-
ters NRAs shall take into account the investment made by the operator and allow him a rea-
sonable rate of return on adequate capital employed, taking into account the risks involved.
One Member State has provided for an additional consideration to be taken into account,
namely investments for the development of networks and innovative services.
The directive also provides that where an operator has an obligation regarding the cost orien-
tation of its prices, the burden of proof that charges are derived from costs should lie with the
operator concerned. It would appear that the draft transposing legislation of one Member State
does not incorporate this requirement. In another this principle is not contained in the primary
legislation but remains to be established in the regulatory decisions of the NRA.
The directive stipulates that in the event that a NRA requires a cost accounting system to be
implemented, a description of that cost accounting system should be made publicly available.
Two Member States seem not to have reflected this requirement in their draft laws.
Digital broadcasting
One Member State which has not yet adopted legislation has excluded conditional access
systems from the scope of its draft law and the primary legislation (adopted or draft) of some
others seems only to deal with a part of the requirements of the Directive in this area.35
4.4. Universal Service Directive
The Universal Service Directive
45 contains a set of rules and principles designed to safeguard
the interests of users and to ensure that liberalisation does not occur at their expense. It is
founded on the premise that competition and market forces are the most effective means to
satisfy user needs, but provides national regulatory authorities with the necessary powers to
protect users’ interests where they need to do so.
Key issues for transposition:
  The scope of universal service should be defined in accordance with the Directive;
  Universal service should be implemented in a way that minimises market distortions;
  The designation of undertaking(s) with universal service obligations should ensure that
universal service is provided in a cost-effective manner. No undertaking should be a priori
excluded from being designated;
  Only the net cost to designated undertakings of the provision of those services that are
covered by the universal service obligation as defined in the Directive may be recovered
through a sharing mechanism or from public funds;
  End-users across the EU should enjoy all of the rights conferred to them in the Directive,
and NRAs should be fully empowered to enforce those rights;
  Obligations should only be imposed on undertakings with SMP in a relevant retail market
where the market is not effectively competitive and NRAs consider that obligations im-
posed at the wholesale level and/or carrier selection and pre-selection are not sufficient to
achieve the objectives of the new framework.
Main concerns:
–  In some Member States the scope of universal service has not been delineated in accor-
dance with the Directive. This has implications regarding the calculation of the net cost of
universal service and any funding schemes;
–  The adopted and draft transposition measures of some Member States seem to have ex-
cluded de facto some operators from being designated with universal service obligations. It
is also not clear as yet whether sufficient account has been taken in all Member States of
the need that the implementation of universal service minimise market distortions;
–  Not all the provisions relating to the rights and facilities to be made available to end-users
appear to be consistently transposed in the Member States;
–  Some national laws (adopted or draft) do not reflect the principle that ex ante obligations
should be imposed on operators as the result of a finding of SMP in a relevant retail market
only if the NRA considers that wholesale remedies and/or carrier selection or pre-selection
are insufficient.
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Universal service obligations
–  Scope
The keystone of universal service remains the provision on request of a connection to the
public telephone network at a fixed location and access to publicly available telephone serv-
ices, at an affordable price, in the whole territory of the European Union. As compared with
the previous regulatory framework, this requirement has been made more precise in terms of
the technologies which may support such connection (which may be fixed or wireless) and the
data rates that the connection should allow for (they must permit functional Internet access).
Some transposition problems arise in regard to the scope of the services covered by the uni-
versal service obligation: in one Member State, there is no explicit provision in the draft law
that universal service should be available in the whole of the national territory. In another
Member State the draft legislation does not require explicitly that the connection to the public
telephone network must permit functional Internet access.
It is not clear whether the obligations relating to specific measures for disabled users or users
with low incomes or special social needs are included within the scope of universal service in
the adopted or draft law of some Member States.
In one Member State certain universal service obligations including social obligations are ap-
plied to all operators as general conditions, rather than as universal service obligations appli-
cable only to the designated universal service provider(s).
–  Designation of undertaking(s) with universal service obligations
In one Member State, universal service obligations are imposed in the law on operators hav-
ing significant market power. Since there is no designation ‘proper’ of universal service op-
erators, many of the relevant provisions of the Directive are not transposed (e.g. relating to the
publication by designated undertakings of information on quality of service).
In another Member State, the draft law also appears to exclude most operators from the possi-
bility of being designated as a universal service provider, at least as regards the provision of
access at a fixed location and telephone booths, since it creates the possibility for designating
an operator for each service, but requires that the operator be able to supply the service on the
whole of the national territory. The objective of the Directive is to ensure that the whole ter-
ritory is covered. To this end Member States may designate one or more operators, and this
designation can be on a regional or a national basis. However, they should use an efficient,
objective, transparent and non-discriminatory mechanism for designation whereby no under-
taking is a priori excluded from being designated.
This in turn could compound the problems of costing the universal service and the operation
of a funding mechanism: since the net cost of the service may be established either by the cost
accounting method or by the results of a call for tender, there is a risk that if the latter option
is taken the incumbent operator could name its price for the costs that are to be reimbursed by
other operators, without regard to the principles of least market distortion or non-
discrimination.
–  Calculation of the net cost of universal service and its financing37
Some Member States have availed themselves in their adopted or draft transposition measures
of the possibility foreseen in the Directive to determine the net cost of universal service
through a tendering procedure.
Most Member States’ adopted or draft transposition measures contain provisions on a sharing
mechanism for financing of universal service obligations. In one of them, while the draft law
only mentions one financing method, namely that of covering the net cost of universal service
by levying contributions from market players, public (ERDF) funds have been requested to
meet certain universal service obligations. In this case the risk of double financing should be
avoided.
Not all the safeguards contained in the Universal Service Directive to ensure that a sharing
mechanism to finance universal service obligations does not distort competition appear to
have been adequately transposed. In some Member States the relevant provisions are not
included in the draft law. In another Member State it appears possible for the incumbent op-
erator to recover from other communications providers part of the cost of providing a service
imposed as a universal service obligation, without the use of any sharing mechanism.
It should be recalled that where Member States choose to operate a scheme for the costing and
financing of universal service obligations, the scheme should be communicated to the
Commission for verification of compatibility with the Treaty.
End-user rights
Beyond the provisions falling within the category of universal service, the Directive contains
a number of requirements that reinforce end-users’ interests by means of specific rights,
ranging from the minimum information to be included in contracts through to the availability
of specific facilities such as directory services and number portability.
Many national transposition measures fail as yet to transpose all the relevant provisions in
sufficient detail to allow their application as from the entry into force of the primary trans-
posing legislation. In particular, it appears that not all NRAs are empowered to impose and
enforce the information and transparency requirements of the Directive.
–  The provision of various facilities
The provision of directory enquiry services and directories is open to competition. The Uni-
versal Service Directive provides that all service providers that assign telephone numbers to
their subscribers are obliged to make relevant information available in a fair, cost-oriented
and non-discriminatory manner. In some Member States, the draft law does not oblige under-
takings to provide relevant information for directory purposes on a cost-oriented basis.
Also, not all Member States which have adopted transposition measures have transposed the
requirements of the Directive relating to the provision of tone dialling and calling line identi-
fication. It remains to be established whether this is because the countries concerned have
concluded, after taking into account the views of interested parties, that there is sufficient ac-
cess to these facilities.
In one Member State which has adopted transposition measures, the availability of mobile
number portability may be delayed until some time in 2004, following recent adoption of sec-
ondary legislation in addition to the primary law aimed at transposing the new framework.
–  Must carry38
Most national measures transposing the new regulatory framework do not introduce must
carry rules; they are usually embedded in other pieces of national legislation, such as audio-
visual laws. Nevertheless, such must carry rules must comply with the principles set out in the
Universal Service Directive, namely that they should only be imposed where they are neces-
sary to meet clearly defined general interest objectives and shall be proportionate and
transparent.
The compliance with the Directive of existing and new national must carry rules has been
called into question by market players in some Member States, particularly in the light of the
proportionality principle.
Regulatory controls on undertakings with SMP in specific retail markets
–  Principles
Not all national laws (adopted or draft) reflect the principle that ex ante obligations should be
imposed on operators as the result of a finding of SMP in a relevant retail market only if the
NRA considers that wholesale remedies and/or carrier selection or pre-selection are
insufficient.
In one Member State the structure of the draft transposition measure does not distinguish
clearly between remedies to be applied at the wholesale level and remedies to be applied at
the retail level, and the question arises as to whether the NRA has been empowered to adopt
all the possible remedies mentioned in the Directive.
One Member State which has adopted legislation has not transposed the provision that where
retail tariff regulation is imposed appropriate cost accounting systems must be implemented
and verified annually and the NRA shall ensure that an annual statement concerning compli-
ance is published.
–  Leased lines and carrier selection and pre-selection
In some Member States, the requirements of the Directive relating to the provision of the
minimum set of leased lines are not included, or are only partially included, in the
transposition legislation (adopted or draft), or remain to be completed by means of secondary
legislation.
In other Member States, either the requirement that pricing of interconnection and access re-
lated to carrier selection and pre-selection by SMP operators be cost oriented is not transposed
or it is unclear whether cost orientation is applicable.
5. E-PRIVACY DIRECTIVE
5.1. Introduction
The e-Privacy Directive was required to be transposed by the Member States before
31 October 2003. It effectively replaced the previous Telecommunications Data Protection
Directive
46 from that date. In view of the closeness of this deadline to the date of publication,
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this report does not contain an analysis of national transposition measures or draft laws. How-
ever, the e-Privacy Directive constitutes a vital element in the new regulatory framework, de-
signed to protect the fundamental interests of end-users, and some of its key requirements
(which the Commission will take particular care are properly reflected in national transposi-
tion measures) are therefore described in this section.
5.2. Traffic data retention
The e-Privacy Directive requires that processed and stored traffic data be erased or made
anonymous when no longer needed for transmission of the communication. Traffic data nec-
essary for billing or interconnection payment purposes may be processed, but only up to the
end of the period during which the bill may be lawfully challenged or payment pursued. Data
may be processed for the provision of value added services, but only for the period necessary
and after consent has been given. Withdrawal of this consent should be possible at all times.
It is important that national law requires subscribers to be informed of the purposes behind the
retention of traffic data (before giving consent) and of the types of data retained.
5.3. Location data
There is a new provision in the directive focusing on the treatment of data indicating the geo-
graphical position of the subscriber’s terminal equipment. A different treatment applies to lo-
cation data than applies to traffic data, in that the former may be processed either anony-
mously or with consent of the user.
It is important that national legislation should ensure that, where processing of the location
data is allowed with the consent of the user, prior to obtaining such consent the user must be
informed of (1) the type of location data that will be processed, (2) the purposes and duration
of the processing and (3) whether the data will be transmitted to a third party. It is also im-
portant that the user can withdraw its consent at any time.
5.4. Unsolicited Communications (spam)
The e-Privacy Directive introduces a requirement that Member States apply an ‘opt-in’ sys-
tem, as a general rule, to unsolicited communications (or spam) produced by means of auto-
matic calling machines, fax machines and electronic mail (including SMS messages).
While the Directive does allow for the possibility of an exception to the general opt-in
principle under which, in the context of a sale of a product or service, contact details may be
used for direct marketing of a company’s own similar products or services), it is important
that, if such an exception is provided by national law, it is strictly drawn, so as to avoid
effectively undermining the opt-in approach.
For other types of direct marketing practices, the Member States can choose to apply an opt-in
or an opt-out system.
Effective and timely enforcement of compliance with the new opt-in approach will be essen-
tial to ensure that subscribers’ interests are protected. The Commission will therefore look to
confirm that national transposition measures provide for real sanctions in the event of breach
of the relevant requirements by direct marketers, including where appropriate financial penal-
ties. This also means that the competent authorities, be they the NRAs or the Data Protection
Authorities, need to have the requisite investigation and enforcement powers.40
5.5. Cookies
The e-Privacy Directive contains a provision, not in the previous Telecommunications Data
Protection Directive (97/66/EC), governing the use of devices for storing or retrieving infor-
mation, such as ‘cookies’. Users must be informed of the purposes of such devices and have
the opportunity to refuse their use or installation on their terminal equipment.
6. COMPETITION DIRECTIVE
6.1. Introduction
In order to make the rules on liberalisation simpler and more transparent, on 16 September
2002 the Commission adopted Directive 2002/77/EC on competition in the markets for elec-
tronic communications networks and services (the Competition Directive). This Directive
consolidates the previous directives in this area
47 and seeks to maintain the necessary coher-
ence with the new Regulatory Framework.
6.2. Main content of Competition Directive: Abolition of special and exclusive rights
In line with the provisions established under Directive  90/388/EEC, the Competition
Directive requires Member States to abolish special or exclusive rights relating to electronic
communications networks and services (including those involving the use of frequencies) and
to ensure that any undertaking is entitled to provide them. Moreover, Member States shall
ensure that any general authorisation allowing undertakings to provide such networks or
services is based on objective, non-discriminatory, proportionate and transparent criteria.
The scope of the Competition Directive is in line with that of the new regulatory framework:
it applies to all networks and services which are concerned with the conveyance of signals by
wire, radio, optical or other electromagnetic means, e.g. fixed, wireless, cable and satellite
networks. It therefore applies to transmission networks and services used for broadcasting of
radio and television programmes but excludes services providing or exercising control over
their content. The Commission is currently investigating whether the regulation of the net-
works and services used for the broadcasting of radio and television programmes and other
audio-visual services in a number of Member States complies with the Competition Directive.
It is worth noting that the Competition Directive also applies to so-called ‘dark–fibre’ net-
works, which are networks that enable third parties to convey signals, using their own
switching or routing equipment.
6.3. Notification requirements
Member States are required to provide the Commission with such information as will allow it
to confirm that the provisions of the Competition Directive have been complied with. They
must also communicate to the Commission their schemes on sharing the net cost of the provi-
sion of universal service. In addition, if a Member State considers that there is sufficient com-
petition in the provision of local loop infrastructure to justify the ending of the obligation of
legal separation of a cable television network from other electronic communications net-
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 and its successive amendments.41
works, then it must inform the Commission accordingly, so that the Commission can decide
whether the obligation may be ended in that Member State.
7. ACCESSION COUNTRIES
Ten countries (Cyprus, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland,
Slovakia, Slovenia) will join the European Union on 1 May 2004. These accession countries
agreed, in the course of the accession negotiations, to implement the 1998 telecoms acquis.
They must clearly also ensure compliance with the new framework as from the date of
accession.
Since the new framework is a development, and builds on the achievements of, the  1998
framework (in particular market liberalisation and ‘open network provision’ (ONP)), the ef-
fective implementation of the old framework by the existing EU  15 was an essential
pre-requisite for the transition to the new one.
Likewise, it is a prerequisite for the accession countries that the same process of liberalisation
and regulation be effectively achieved in the run-up to the full application of the new
framework within their territories. Once the requirements of the old framework have been put
in place, the process of market analysis and review of obligations can be conducted effec-
tively as contemplated by the new framework.
This is consistent with the provisions of Article 27 of the Framework Directive, which re-
quires Member States to maintain under national law the regulatory obligations imposed un-
der the old framework provisions referred to in that article (essentially the SMP obligations),
until those obligations are reviewed in accordance with the process of market analysis and
consultation with the Commission and other NRAs provided for in the new framework (par-
ticularly the Article 7 notification process). In the case of the accession countries, it is possi-
ble for this process to be carried out legally only once they have formally acceded to the EU.
As a result it is anticipated that the accession countries will take the following steps in order
to meet their Community obligations in the electronic communications sector:
  The accession countries will implement in full, and maintain in force until after the date of
accession, the requirements of those provisions of the old framework referred to in Arti-
cle 27 of the Framework Directive. They should then conduct (or complete) the market
analysis and review of obligations in full conformity with the procedures of the new
framework (including notification to the Commission and other NRAs under Article 7), as
soon as possible after accession, so that the obligations concerned can be amended, with-
drawn or maintained as appropriate;
  As far as the other requirements of the old framework are concerned (i.e. in broad terms
the general legal framework for telecommunications and the rights and obligations gener-
ally applicable in the sector), by the date of accession these will have been, on the one
hand, implemented effectively in accordance with the commitments made in the accession
negotiations and, on the other, adapted where necessary to comply with the requirements
of the new framework. As an example, by the date of accession the system of authorisation
of electronic communications networks and services in an accession country would comply
with the new framework by providing for general authorisation and rights of use only.42
In the next implementation report, which the Commission intends to issue in the fourth quar-
ter of 2004, the status of transposition and application of the electronic communications di-
rectives in the newly acceded Member States will be assessed alongside that of the current
Member States (EU 15).
8. PROCEDURE FOR NOTIFICATION OF NATIONAL REGULATORY MEASURES
In order to ensure the development of a consistent regulatory practice throughout the Com-
munity, Article 7 of the Framework Directive puts in place a new procedure requiring NRAs
to notify to the Commission and all other NRAs inter alia all draft measures defining relevant
markets and designating undertakings as having Significant Market Power (SMP), where the
measures in question would affect trade between Member States. Pursuant to that Article, the
Commission has a power of veto, since it can require an NRA to withdraw and amend the no-
tified measure if it has serious doubts as to its compatibility with Community law.
The Commission has created the structures necessary to enable it to perform its tasks in the
most efficient way from a legal and operational point of view.
The first notification was received on 4  August 2003 from OFTEL, the United Kingdom
regulatory authority. The notifications received so far from that authority concern the follow-
ing markets: i) mobile access and call origination, ii) fixed geographic call termination, iii)
wholesale unmetered narrowband internet termination, iv) fixed narrowband retail, v) whole-
sale international services, and vi) fixed narrowband wholesale exchange line, call origina-
tion, conveyance and transit.
The Commission made comments on the draft regulatory measures pursuant to Article 7(3) of
the Framework Directive.
48
An increasing number of notifications is expected in the coming weeks and months. A num-
ber of ‘pre-notification’ meetings with NRAs have been held, and have proved extremely
useful. Additional meetings have also taken place with industry players and associations for
the purpose of clarifying the Article 7 procedures.
9. INFRINGEMENT PROCEEDINGS
As stated above, the Commission has stressed the importance of full, effective and timely im-
plementation of the new regulatory framework for electronic communications. The Commis-
sion’s Internal Market Strategy
49 in particular points out that late transposition and ineffective
enforcement remain a serious problem for the proper functioning of the single market as a
whole.
The Commission opened around 250 infringement proceedings to support the implementation
of the 1998 regulatory package, and will continue to play a proactive role in relation to the
new framework in order to achieve maximum legal certainty for market players and investors
in this highly dynamic sector.
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The Commission is monitoring the transposition process closely, and has already opened pro-
ceedings against those Member States which failed to incorporate the four directives (Frame-
work, Authorisation, Access and Users’ Rights) into national law by 24 July 2003.
50 It will
also launch infringement proceedings against Member States that have failed to transpose the
e-Privacy Directive by 31 October 2003.
The correct implementation of the Directives will be one of the priorities to be focused on
when analysing national transposition measures. Further, and for the sake of legal certainty
and transparency, the Commission regards it as a priority to enforce the specific notification
requirements imposed on Member States under the new framework, concerning, for instance,
the individual NRAs and their assigned tasks and responsibilities as well as SMP operators
and universal service providers. The Commission will also monitor the fulfilment of the
Member States’ obligation to take account of recommendations adopted to ensure the consis-
tent application of the new framework, including the Recommendations on relevant markets
and on procedures under Article 7 of the Framework Directive.
The Commission has also pointed out that it is important to complement formal infringement
proceedings with alternative means of achieving rapid results when monitoring the application
of Community law.
51 This may be a more effective and proportionate method than in-
fringement proceedings. In this regard the Commission is working closely with the Member
States’ authorities, and in particular with the independent national regulatory authorities. In
addition to the European Regulators’ Group (ERG), co-operation already takes place in the
Communications Committee (COCOM), the Radio Spectrum Committee (RSC) and the Ra-
dio Spectrum Policy Group (RSPG), and in bilateral meetings with the Member States.
Finally, regular reporting on the implementation of the regulatory framework and market de-
velopments has proved to be an efficient tool for monitoring correct implementation, which
the Commission intends to continue to use in the future.
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